Security & trust

Information control, by design.

Define what information AI can use, where it can run and when a person needs to decide. Keep the policy and the record close to the work.

  • Local-first transformation

    Detection and tokenisation run inside your environment, before anything crosses.

  • Model & tool allowlists

    Only destinations you have approved are routable by policy.

  • Policy decisions

    Each crossing is evaluated against explicit, versioned policy, not convention.

  • Identity & access context

    Requests carry who is asking, from where, under which role.

  • Encryption & isolation patterns

    Encrypted transport and storage, with per-environment isolation.

  • Human approval gates

    Consequential actions can require a named person to approve before execution.

  • Decision history

    A detailed audit trail records each decision; crossings can be reviewed after the fact.

  • Evidence-backed outputs

    Outputs can be linked to the sources that support them, or flagged when they are not.

  • Data retention controls

    You decide what the boundary keeps, for how long, and where.

A reviewable decision

Know what happened.
Understand why.

Information treatment, route selection and human approvals belong in the same story. Explore the record a reviewer can use to follow the decision.

Read an example decision record

Shared responsibility

A clear boundary.
A clear understanding.

Information controls work alongside your people, infrastructure and security practices. Architecture and deployment documentation are part of the conversation.

Designed to reduce

  • Sensitive-value egress

    Restricted identifiers, references, and codewords leaving with an AI request.

  • Unapproved model or tool use

    Requests reaching models or tools outside your allowlist.

  • Unaudited AI actions

    Crossings and actions that leave no reviewable record.

  • Unattributable outputs

    Generated claims with no link to the evidence behind them.

Not solved by the boundary alone

  • Endpoint compromise

    A compromised workstation or host sits before the boundary. Endpoint and OS security remain yours.

  • Insider misuse outside the boundary

    A person or administrator with legitimate access acting outside monitored paths.

  • Policy misconfiguration

    BoundSense enforces the rules configured for it. Incorrect or overly permissive policies can still allow unsafe behaviour and need operational review.

  • Prompt injection and unsafe tool behaviour

    Input controls, route restrictions, approval gates, and audit trails reduce exposure. No boundary eliminates every adversarial prompt or downstream tool-execution risk.

  • Model correctness

    The boundary governs what a model sees and where it runs, not whether its answer is right.

  • Upstream model and infrastructure integrity

    The supply chain of the models and provider infrastructure you choose to run is a shared responsibility.

Model, application and distributed-system considerations

Model evaluation is task-specific

Benchmarks measure the evaluated scope only; they do not establish general performance.

Small-model success is not general capability

A small model clearing one task threshold implies nothing about other tasks.

Benchmark leakage and dataset defects

Training and evaluation can inherit or amplify dataset defects and leakage; data quality remains a shared responsibility.

Local execution is not security

Running locally reduces egress exposure but does not by itself make a system secure.

Fallback routes can increase exposure

Escalating to a larger external model widens the crossing; fallback paths need the same policy scrutiny as primary routes.

Channel connectors depend on platforms

Axon conversation connectors depend on external platform controls and availability.

Human agents are a boundary

People handling escalated conversations remain part of the trust boundary.

Distributed execution is not a privacy technology

Keeping raw examples and corpora in place narrows what crosses. It is not secure aggregation, differential privacy, confidential computing or zero-knowledge protection, and the metrics or excerpts that do cross can still carry inference risk.

Aggregate results can hide local failures

A global metric can pass while a required environment fails. Distributed evaluation is designed to keep that failure visible and hold promotion; an aggregate on its own is not a release decision.

Distributed capabilities are planned

Private distributed evaluation and governed distributed retrieval are roadmap architecture. Neither is implemented, and neither is available in pilots today.

Explore deployment patterns

A first conversation

Start with
one workflow.

Tell us the task and where the information must stay. We'll show a relevant example and discuss whether a scoped pilot makes sense.

Request a demo